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Abstract
Classic decision-theory is based on the maximum expected utility (MEU) principle, but
crucially ignores the resource costs incurred when determining optimal decisions. Here we
propose an axiomatic framework for bounded decision-making that considers resource costs.
Agents are formalized as probability measures over input-output streams. We postulate
that any such probability measure can be assigned a corresponding conjugate utility
function based on three axioms: utilities should be real-valued, additive and monotonic
mappings of probabilities. We show that these axioms enforce a unique conversion law
between utility and probability (and thereby, information). Moreover, we show that
this relation can be characterized as a variational principle: given a utility function, its
conjugate probability measure maximizes a free utility functional. Transformations of
probability measures can then be formalized as a change in free utility due to the addition
of new constraints expressed by a target utility function. Accordingly, one obtains a
criterion to choose a probability measure that trades off the maximization of a target utility
function and the cost of the deviation from a reference distribution. We show that optimal
control, adaptive estimation and adaptive control problems can be solved this way in a
resource-efficient way. When resource costs are ignored, the MEU principle is recovered.
Our formalization might thus provide a principled approach to bounded rationality that
establishes a close link to information theory.
1. Introduction
Rational decision-making is based on the principle of (subjective) maximum expected utility
(MEU) (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944; Savage, 1954; Anscombe, F. J. and Aumann, R. J.,
1963). According to the MEU principle, a rational agent chooses its action a so as to
maximize its expected utility
E[U|a] =
∑
s
Pr(s|a)U(s)
given the probability Pr(s|a) that action a ∈ A will lead to outcome s ∈ S and given that
the desirability of the outcome s is measured by the utility U(s) ∈ R. Thus, expected
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utilities express betting preferences over lotteries with uncertain outcomes. The optimal
action a∗ ∈ A is defined as the one that maximizes the expected utility, that is
a∗ := argmax
a
E[U|a].
What is not apparent from this simple formula, however, is that finding the optimal action
can be very difficult, especially for decision-making problems in uncertain environments
with very large space of outcomes S. One could easily imagine that computing the optimal
answer is so costly (in terms of computational resources), that one would rather content
oneself with a slightly “sub-optimal” solution that incurs into less resource costs. The
problem is, however, that the MEU principle as stated above does not formally consider
resource costs, and hence the problem of limited resources is ignored. Attempts to take
resource costs into account for efficient decision-making have led to the important concept
of (resource-)bounded rationality (Simon, 1982).
In this paper we propose an axiomatic formalization of bounded rationality that
interprets a decision-maker’s behavior (characterized by a probability measure) as an
implicit manifestation of his preferences. We postulate three axioms that lead to a
quantitative conversion between utilities and probabilities (and ultimately, information),
which establishes a duality between the probability- and utility-representation of a decision-
maker. We show that the link between these representations can be characterized by a
variational principle, which allows interpreting the probability measure as the equilibrium
distribution over a constraint landscape determined by the utility function. Based on this
interpretation, we then formalize the problem of maximizing the expectation of a target
utility function as a transformation of an initial probability measure (encoding the prior
behavior of the decision-maker) into a final probability measure that considers both the
deviation from the initial probability measure and the new constraint given by the target
utility function. We show how this leads to a principled way to choose a probability measure
that optimally trades off the benefits of maximizing the target utilities against the costs of
transforming the probability measure. We apply this formalism to stochastic systems that
process an input-output (I/O) stream in a sequential fashion and construct a generalized
variational principle for this setup. Finally, we show how to apply this generalized principle
to derive solutions to the problems of optimal control, adaptive estimation and adaptive
control.
2. Conversion between probability and utility
2.1 Preliminaries and notation
We introduce the following notation. A set is denoted by a calligraphic letter like X and
consists of elements or symbols. Strings are finite concatenations of symbols. The
empty string is denoted by ǫ. X n denotes the set of strings of length n based on X . For
substrings, the following shorthand notation is used: a string that runs from index i to k
is written as xi:k := xixi+1 . . . xk−1xk. Similarly, x≤i := x1x2 . . . xi is a string starting from
the first index. By convention, xi:j := ǫ if i > j. Logarithms are always taken with respect
to base 2, thus log(2) = 1. The symbol P(X ) denotes the powerset of X , i.e. the set of all
subsets of X .
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To simplify the exposition, all probability spaces are assumed to be finite. Due to this,
we clarify some terminology. A probability space is a triple (Ω,F ,P) where Ω is the
sample space, F := P(Ω) is the σ-algebra of events, and P is the probability measure
over F . A sample or outcome is an element ω ∈ Ω. An event is a member of F and
hence a finite set of outcomes. An atom is a singleton {ω} ∈ F . A random variable is a
function X : Ω → X mapping each outcome ω into a symbol X(ω) from a finite alphabet
X . The probability of the random variable X taking on the value x ∈ X is defined as
P(x) := P(X = x) := P({ω ∈ Ω : X(ω) = x}).
2.2 Utility
Consider a stochastic system whose behavior is represented by a probability space (Ω,F ,P).
The probability measure P fully characterizes the generative law of the potential events that
the system can obtain. Thus, if P(A) > P(B), then the propensity of A is higher than that
of B. This difference in probability can be given a teleological interpretation: A is more
probable than B because A is more desirable than B. For reasons that will become apparent,
a measure that quantifies such differences in desirability is called a utility function. If there
is such a measure, then it is reasonable to demand the following three properties:
i. Utilities should be mappings from conditional events into real numbers.
ii. Utilities should be additive up to an arbitrary translation constant1.
iii. A more probable event should have a higher utility than a less probable event.
The three properties can then be summarized as follows.
Definition 1. Let (Ω,F ,P) be a probability space. A function U is a utility function for
P iff it has the following three properties for all events A,B,C,D ∈ F and some constant
β ∈ R:
i. U(A|B) ∈ R, (real-valued)
ii. U(A ∩B|C) = U(A|C) +U(B|A ∩ C)− β, (additive)
iii. P(A|B) > P(C|D) ⇔ U(A|B) > U(C|D). (monotonic)
Furthermore, we use the abbreviation U(A) := U(A|Ω) for “unconditional” events.
From property (ii) it is seen that the translation U′(·) = U(·)−β leads to a strict additivity
of U′:
U(A ∩B) = U(A) +U(B|A)− β,
(U′(A ∩B) + β) = (U′(A) + β) + (U′(B|A) + β)− β,
U′(A ∩B) = U′(A) +U′(B|A).
1. That is, the utility of a joint event should be obtained by summing up the utilities of the sub-events
(up to an arbitrary translation constant). The translation constant accounts for the fact that absolute
values of utilities are not meaningful: only differences between utilities matter. For example, the “utility
of drinking coffee and eating a croissant” should equal “the utility of drinking coffee” plus the “utility
of having a croissant given the reward of drinking coffee” minus a translation constant.
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The following theorem shows that these three properties enforce a strict mapping between
probabilities and utilities.
Theorem 2. If f is such that U(A|B) = f(P(A|B)) for any probability space (Ω,F ,P),
then f is of the form
f(·) = α log(·) + β,
where α > 0 is arbitrary strictly positive constant and β is an arbitrary constant.
Proof. Let f be such that f(P(C|D)) = U(C|D) for all C,D ∈ F . Let A1, A2, . . . , An ∈ F
be a sequence of events such that P(A1) = P(Ai|
⋂
j<iAj) > 0 for all i = 1, . . . , n. Applying
f yields the equivalence
P(A1) = P
(
Ai
∣∣∣⋂
j<i
Aj
)
⇐⇒ U(A1) = U
(
Ai
∣∣∣⋂
j<i
Aj
)
for all i = 1, . . . , n. Using the previous properties, the product rule for probabilities and
the additivity property for utilities, one can show
f
(
P(A1)
n
)
= f
( n∏
i=1
P
(
Ai
∣∣∣⋂
j<i
Aj
))
= f
(
P(A1 ∩ · · · ∩An)
)
= U(A1 ∩ · · ·An)
=
n∑
i=1
(
U
(
Ai
∣∣∣⋂
j<i
Aj
)
− β
)
= n
(
U(A1)− β
)
= n
(
f(P(A1))− β
)
.
Since P(A1) is arbitrary, this means that
f(pn) = n(f(p)− β)
for arbitrary p ∈ (0, 1] and n ∈ N.
The rest of the argument parallels Shannon’s entropy theorem (Shannon, 1948). Let
p, q ∈ (0, 1] such that q < p. Choose an arbitrarily large m ∈ N and find an n ∈ N to satisfy
qm ≤ pn < qm+1. Taking the logarithm, and dividing by n log q one obtains
m
n
<
log p
log q
<
m
n
+
1
n
. (1)
Similarly, using f(pn) = n(f(p)− β) and the monotonicity of f , we have
qm < pn < qm+1
⇐⇒ f(qm) < f(pn) < f(qm+1)
⇐⇒ m(f(q)− β) < n(f(p)− β) < (m+ 1)(f(q)− β).
Dividing the last set of inequalities by n(f(p)− β) yields
m
n
<
f(p)− β
f(q)− β
<
m
n
+
1
n
. (2)
Combining the inequalities in (1) and (2), one gets∣∣∣ log p
log q
−
f(p)− β
f(q)− β
∣∣∣ < 2
n
.
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Since m,n can be chosen arbitrary large, this implies
log p
log q
=
f(p)− β
f(q)− β
in the limit n→∞. Fixing q and rearranging terms gives the functional form
f(p) = α log p+ β,
where α must be positive to satisfy the monotonicity property.
Thus, Theorem 2 establishes the relation
U(A|B) = α logP(A|B) + β,
and in particular,
U(Ω) = β.
In general, if a probability measure P and a utility function U satisfy this relation, then we
say that they are conjugate. Given that this transformation is a bijection, one has that
P(A|B) = exp
{
1
α
(U(A|B) −U(Ω))
}
.
There are two important observations with respect to this particular functional form. First,
note that h(A|B) := − logP(A|B) is just the Shannon information content of A given B.
Therefore,
U(A|B) = −αh(A|B) + β.
Second, this transformation implies that the probability measure P is the Gibbs measure
with temperature α and energy levels e(ω) := −U({ω}), i.e. the measure given by
P(A) =
∑
ω∈A exp(−
1
α
e(ω))∑
ω∈Ω exp(−
1
α
e(ω))
for all A ∈ F . In statistical mechanics, the Gibbs measure is the equilibrium distribution for
a given energy landscape. For this reason, we call α > 0 the temperature. The definition
of utility extends to random variables in the natural way. Thus, given a random variable
X with values in X , the utility of x ∈ X is given by U(x) = α logP(x) + β.
2.3 Variational principle
The conversion between probability and utility established in Theorem 2 satisfies a
variational principle.
Theorem 3. Let X be a random variable with values in X . Let P and U be a conjugate
pair of probability measure and utility function over X. Define the free utility functional
as
J(Pr;U) :=
∑
x∈X
Pr(x)U(x) − α
∑
x∈X
Pr(x) logPr(x),
where Pr is an arbitrary probability measure over X. Then,
J(Pr;U) ≤ J(P;U) = U(Ω).
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Proof. A similar proof to the present one is given in Keller (1998, Theorem 1.1.3). Rewriting
terms using the utility-probability conversion and applying Jensen’s inequality yields
J(Pr;U) =
∑
x∈X
Pr(x)U(x) − α
∑
x∈X
Pr(x) logPr(x)
= α
∑
x∈X
Pr(x) log
exp( 1
α
U(x))
Pr(x)
≤ α log
∑
x∈X
Pr(x)
exp( 1
α
U(x))
Pr(x)
= α log
∑
x∈X
P(x) exp(U(Ω))
= U(Ω),
with equality iff
exp(
1
α
U(x))
Pr(x) is constant, i.e. if Pr = P.
The free utility2 is the expected utility of the system plus the uncertainty over the
outcome. The variational principle tells us that the probability law P of the system is the
one that maximizes the free utility for a given utility function U, since
P = argmax
Pr
J(Pr;U).
Here the utility function U plays the role of a constraint landscape for the probability
measure P. As the temperature α approaches zero, the probability measure P(x)
approaches a delta function δx∗(x), where x
∗ = argmaxxU(x). Similarly, as α → ∞,
P(x) → 1|X | , i.e. the uniform distribution over X . Hence, the temperature α plays the role
of the conversion factor between resources and utilities.
PSfrag replacements
Pi,Ui Pf ,Uf
+U∗
Figure 1: A transformation from a system (Pi,Ui) into a system (Pf ,Uf ) by addition of
a constraint U∗.
The variational principle allows conceptualizing transformations of stochastic systems
(Figure 1). Consider an initial system having probability measure Pi and utility function
Ui. This system satisfies the equation
Ji :=
∑
x∈X
Pi(x)Ui(x)− α
∑
x∈X
Pi(x) logPi(x) = Ui(Ω).
2. The functional F := −J is also known as the Helmholtz free energy in thermodynamics. F is a measure
of the “useful” work obtainable from a closed thermodynamic system at a constant temperature and
volume.
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We add new constraints represented by the utility function U∗. Then, the resulting utility
function Uf is given by the sum
Uf = Ui +U∗,
and the resulting probability measure Pf maximizes
J(Pr,Uf ) =
∑
x∈X
Pr(x)Uf (x)− α
∑
x∈X
Pr(x) logPr(x)
=
∑
x∈X
Pr(x)(Ui(x) +U∗(x)) − α
∑
x∈X
Pr(x) logPr(x)
=
∑
x∈X
Pr(x)U∗(x)− α
∑
x∈X
Pr(x) log
Pr(x)
Pi(x)
+Ui(Ω).
Let Jf := J(Pf ,Uf ). The difference in free utility is
Jf − Ji =
∑
x∈X
Pf (x)U∗(x)− α
∑
x∈X
Pf (x) log
Pf (x)
Pi(x)
. (3)
The difference in free utility has an interpretation that is crucial for the formalization of
bounded rationality: it is the expected target utility U∗ (first term) penalized by the cost
of transforming Pi into Pf (second term). Clearly, (3) is a functional to be maximized.
Depending on the givens and the unknowns, this leads to different variational problems.
We emphasize the two cases that are important for our exposition:
1. Control. If we fix the initial probability measure Pi and the constraint utilities U∗,
then the final system Pf optimizes the trade-off between utility and resource costs.
That is,
Pf = argmax
Pr
∑
x∈X
Pr(x)U∗(x)− α
∑
x∈X
Pr(x) log
Pr(x)
Pi(x)
. (4)
The solution is given by
Pf (x) ∝ Pi(x) exp
(
1
α
U∗(x)
)
.
In particular, at very low temperature α ≈ 0, (3) becomes
Jf − Ji ≈
∑
x∈X
Pf (x)U∗(x),
and hence resource costs are ignored in the choice of Pf , leading to Pf ≈ δx∗(x),
where x∗ = maxxU∗(x). Similarly, at a high temperature, the difference is
Jf − Ji ≈ −α
∑
x∈X
Pf (x) log
Pf (x)
Pi(x)
,
and hence only resource costs matter, leading to Pf ≈ Pi.
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2. Estimation. If we fix the final probability measure Pf and the constraint utilities U∗,
then the initial system Pi satisfies
Pi = argmax
Pr
∑
x∈X
Pf (x)U∗(x)− α
∑
x∈X
Pf (x) log
Pf (x)
Pr(x)
(5)
= argmin
Pr
∑
x∈X
Pf (x) log
Pf (x)
Pr(x)
,
and thus we have recovered the minimum relative entropy principle for estimation,
having the solution
Pi = Pf .
Varying the initial distribution Pi is equivalent to varying the utility Ui as part of
Uf such that the given distribution Pf becomes the equilibrium distribution.
Alternatively, one can regard control as the problem of finding Pf given U∗ and Ui; and
estimation as the problem of findingUi given Pf and U∗. This is easily seen after rewriting
the terms in (3).
3. I/O systems
We now turn our discussion to I/O systems. Informally, I/O systems model anything that
has an I/O stream, like a calculator, a human cell, an animal, a computer program or a
robot. In this sense, an I/O system is not required to be a discretely identifiable (physical)
entity as long as there is a viewpoint from which it appears to have an I/O stream. For
example, from a robot’s perspective, its environment is a well-defined system too because it
has an “input channel” to absorb the robot’s actions and an “output channel” to produce
the robot’s perceptions.
The mathematical description of an I/O system can be done at several levels. This paper
focusses on two of them: behavior and beliefs. A model of behavior is a direct specification
of an I/O system that merely describes the statistics of the I/O stream. A model of beliefs
is an indirect specification of an I/O system that has the advantage of representing the I/O
system’s underlying assumptions that give rise to its behavior.
3.1 Model of behavior
Formally, an I/O system is an abstract model of a (stochastic) machine that processes
input symbols and generates output symbols. These symbols are exchanged with another
(external) I/O system via an I/O channel (Figure 2).
The interaction between two I/O systems proceeds in cycles t = 1, 2, . . . , T following a
predefined protocol. The protocol determines which system is responsible for each cycle. In
cycle t, the responsible system generates a symbol xt conditioned on the past symbols x<t.
Then the cycle t+ 1 starts.
If one wants to characterize the way an I/O system behaves, it is necessary to specify
the statistics governing its potential I/O stream. One can encapsulate all the details by
providing the probability distribution over the potential I/O sequences.
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PSfrag replacements
P Q
X1
X2
X3
XT
Figure 2: Two I/O systems P and Q interacting with each other.
Definition 4. An I/O system is a probability measure P over T random variables
X1,X2, . . . ,XT taking on values in finite alphabets X1,X2, . . . ,XT .
Because the I/O system processes both input and output symbols, the probability mea-
sure P contains both evidential and generative probabilities. The evidential probabilities,
called plausibilities, allow the I/O system to infer properties about its input stream;
while the generative probabilities, called propensities, prescribe the law to generate its
output stream. Hence, if xt is generated by an external I/O system, then P(xt|x<t) is the
plausibility of observing xt given the past I/O string x<t; while if xt is generated by the
I/O system P itself, then P(xt|x<t) is the propensity of producing xt given the past I/O
string x<t.
3.2 Model of beliefs
While the previous definition contains all the necessary details to describe the behavior of
an I/O system, it falls short modeling the I/O system’s underlying assumptions that bring
about its behavior. Importantly, it is desirable to model the uncertainties two interacting
I/O systems have about each other, because these uncertainties play a fundamental roˆle in
conceptualizing adaptive behavior. The aim of this section is to introduce a model for I/O
systems that allows explicitly representing these uncertainties.
3.2.1 Causal Models
From the point of view of an I/O system P that is interacting with an I/O system Q,
one needs to represent (a) the uncertainty P has about Q and (b) the uncertainty Q
has about P. Following a Bayesian approach, both uncertainties are modeled by the
introduction of hidden/undisclosed variables. More specifically, cases (a) and (b) can be
modeled by undisclosed inputs and undisclosed outputs respectively, i.e. symbols that are
generated but kept hidden from the other system3. The inclusion of undisclosed random
variables requires extending the interaction model as follows.
3. Undisclosed inputs, commonly known as hypotheses or latent variables in Bayesian statistics, are at the
heart of Bayesian inference (Jaynes and Bretthorst, 2003). In game theory, undisclosed outputs determine
the player types. Player types are the crucial component of a Bayesian game whose purpose is to model
games with incomplete information (Osborne and Rubinstein, 1999).
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The interaction between two I/O systems proceeds in cycles t = 1, 2, . . . , T . In each
cycle, either one of the two systems generates a symbol xt conditioned on the previously
observed symbols. The symbol xt might be either disclosed or undisclosed. A disclosed
symbol is observed by both systems, while an undisclosed one is only observed by the
system who generated it. After a symbol is generated, the I/O systems that have observed
it update their belief states.
To illustrate how uncertainty is modeled, consider the familiar Bayesian estimator. Let
D := D1 × . . . ×DN be a set of strings, where each Dn, 1 ≤ n ≤ N , is a finite alphabet. A
Bayesian estimator over D with hypotheses Θ is a probability measure P over Θ×D of the
form
P (d≤N ) =
∑
θ∈Θ
P (d≤N |θ)P (θ), (6)
where: d≤N is an observation string with dn ∈ Dn for all 1 ≤ n ≤ N ; θ ∈ Θ is a hypothesis;
P (d≤N |θ) is the likelihood of d≤N under the hypothesis θ; and P (θ) is the prior probability
of the hypothesis θ. The Bayesian estimator is an adaptive predictor: it uses the symbols
observed in the past to predict the next symbol. The predictive distribution over the n-th
observation (1 ≤ n ≤ N) conditioned on the past observations d<n is then given by
P (dn|d<n) =
∑
θ∈Θ
P (dn|θ, d<n)P (θ|d<n), (7)
where P (dn|θ, d<n) is the likelihood of dn under hypothesis θ given the past observations d<n
and P (θ|d<n) is the posterior probability of θ given the past observations d<n. Both of these
quantities are obtained from P (θ, d≤N ) by applying standard probability calculus. It is easy
to see that this probabilistic model corresponds to an I/O system P over a sequence x≤T
where: T := N + 1; x1 := θ is an undisclosed input drawn from X1 := Θ; and xt := dt−1
(2 ≤ t ≤ T ) is a disclosed input drawn from Xt := Dt−1. The probability measure P is
constructed from P as
P(θ, d≤N ) := P (θ)P (d1)P (d2|d1) · · ·P (dN |d<N ),
where one has to notice that P 6= P because θ is unobserved and thus cannot be used to
condition , i.e.
P(dn|θ, d<n) = P (dn|d<n) =
∑
θ′∈Θ
P (dn|θ
′, d<n)P (θ
′) 6= P (dn|θ, d<n).
Hence, this illustrates two facts. First, undisclosed inputs play the role of hypotheses.
Second, the model P and the I/O system P are in general not the same.
Extending this scheme to include outputs as well is not straightforward. If some of the dn
are generated by the system itself, then (7) does not hold anymore, because outputs are
syntactically different from inputs, requiring belief updates governed by causal constraints.
Essentially, an input provides the system with information about the whole history of the
stochastic process, while an output, by virtue of being generated by the system itself as a
function of the past, provides the system only with information about the present and future
of the stochastic process because the past cannot be changed. See for instance Shafer (1996),
10
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Pearl (2000), Spirtes and Scheines (2001) and Dawid (2010) for a more in-depth exposition
of causality.
In order carry out the belief updates following outputs, it is necessary to know
the causal probability model for P . The causal probability model consists of a set of
conditional probability measures highlighting the functional dependencies amongst the
random variables. This is reflected in the following definition.
PSfrag replacements
output input
disclosed
undisclosed
observable
P Q P Q
P Q P Q
X X
X X
Figure 3: The four types of random variables with respect to P . Solid arrows mean that
the value of the random variable is disclosed, while dashed arrows mean that the
value is undisclosed. The enclosed area contains the random variables that are
observable by P .
Definition 5. A causal model of an I/O system is a set of T conditional probability
measures P (X1), P (X2|X1), . . . , P (XT |X<T ) over typed random variables X1,X2, . . . ,XT
taking on values in finite alphabets X1,X2, . . . ,XT .
The causal model explains how the random variables functionally depend on each other.
In particular, for all t ≥ 1, the value of Xt is generated as a function of the values of
X1, . . . ,Xt−1. The probability measure P over all the random variables is obtained by the
product rule:
P (X1, . . . ,XT ) :=
T∏
t=1
P (Xt|X<t).
For notational convenience, we will use the letter P as a shorthand for the whole causal
model.
The type of a random variable specifies whether it an input or an output, and whether it
is disclosed or undisclosed (Figure 3). Both distinctions give rise to 2×2 = 4 possible types.
If a random variable Xt is not an undisclosed input, then we say that it is observable. In
this sense, being or not observable is not a type, but a property of the random variable. The
operational significance of the type of random variables will become clear in the context of
belief updates.
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Ortega & Braun
3.2.2 Belief updates
When an I/O system observes the value xt ∈ Xt of a random variable Xt, then its
information state is updated. This update depends on whether Xt is an input or an output.
If Xt is an input, then the update is logical. If Xt is an output, then the update is causal.
This difference is illustrated in Figure 4.
PSfrag replacements
X2 = 1
X2 ← 1
X1 X2 X3
X1 X2 X3 X1 X2 X3
X1 X2 X3 X1 X2 X3
Figure 4: A logical versus a causal update. The figure shows three causally ordered
random variables X1, X2 and X3 (taking on binary values) and their probabilities
(through the height of their boxes). Two updates are compared: the logical
update X2 = 1 and the causal update X2 ← 1. These updates eliminate the
incompatible probability mass (as shown in the first column after the update)
and then normalize the remaining probability mass (second column after the
update). Note that a logical update affects the probability mass of the whole
history, eliminating the incompatible realizations; while a causal update affects
only the probability mass of the present and the future.
A logical update models a measurement. As such, it provides information about
the whole realization of the stochastic process. That is, learning the value of Xt provides
information about all {Xs : t ≤ s ≤ T} through the dependencies established by the causal
model for P . A logical update Xt = xt changes all conditional probabilities as
P (A|B)
Xt=xt−−−−→ P (A|B,Xt = xt),
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where A and B are arbitrary events. The plausibility of observing a sequence x1, x2, . . . , xt
(in this order) is given by
P (x1)P (x2|x1)P (x3|x1, x2) · · ·P (xt|x1, . . . , xt−1) = P (x≤t),
where the last equality follows from basic probability calculus.
A causal update models a decision. As such, it only provides information about the
future of the realization of the stochastic process, but not about its past. That is, learning
the value of Xt provides information about {Xs : s ≥ t, s ∈ N} only. Furthermore, the
random variable Xt is rendered independent from its past, thereby reflecting the autonomy
of the decision. A causal update Xt ← xt changes all conditional probabilities as
P (A|B)
Xt←xt−−−−→ P (A|B,Xt ← xt) = P
′(A|B,Xt = xt),
where A and B are arbitrary events and where P ′ is the probability measure uniquely
defined by the equations
i. P ′(X<t) = P (X<t), (past)
ii. P ′(Xt|X<t) = δxt(Xt), (present)
iii. P ′(Xt+1:T |X≤t) = P (Xt+1:T |X≤t). (future)
(8)
When the random variable Xt is clear from the context, we use the abbreviation
P (A|B, xˆt) := P (A|B,Xt ← xt).
The propensity of generating a sequence x1, x2, . . . , xt (in this order) is given by
P (x1)P (x2|xˆ1)P (x3|xˆ1, xˆ2) · · ·P (xt|xˆ1, . . . , xˆt−1) = P (x≤t),
where the equality is obtained by using the definition of causal updates and then applying
basic probability calculus.
When an I/O system does not observe the value xt ∈ Xt of a random variable Xt because
it is an undisclosed input, then its information state is not updated. That is, an unobserved
update Xt = xt leaves all conditional probabilities unchanged, i.e.
P (A|B)
Xt=xt
// P (A|B) ,
where A and B are arbitrary events.
3.2.3 Deriving behavior from beliefs
As anticipated previously, a model P of an I/O system P gives rise to a probability measure
characterizing an I/O system. The probability measure P is derived from the causal model
P as follows:
Definition 6. Let P be a causal model of an I/O system. The associated I/O system
P is the I/O system recursively defined as
P(ǫ) := 1, P(x≤t) := P(x<t)P (xt|obs(x<t)), (9)
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where the auxiliary function obs(·) is given by
obs(ǫ) := ǫ, obs(x≤t) :=


obs(x<t)xˆt if Xt is an output,
obs(x<t)xt if Xt is a disclosed input,
obs(x<t) if Xt is an undisclosed input.
In this definition, obs(x≤t) selects the values that the I/O system has observed at time
t + 1, flagging them as either causal or logical belief updates. By construction, P has the
important property that for all x≤t,
P(xt|x<t) = P (xt|obs(x<t)).
3.3 The variational principle in I/O systems
Let us assume that we are in possession of a reference I/O system P0 (or its causal model P0)
encoding our current knowledge. The problem is that we wish to convert P0 into an I/O
system P maximizing a given target utility function U∗. We assume further that P0, P
and U∗ share their random variables including the causal order and types. As we have
argued previously, any transformation of a probability measure incurs into costs. These
costs can potentially be so high that they jeopardize the benefits of na¨ıvely maximizing
the expectation of U∗. We therefore seek an optimality principle that allows finding a
probability measure P that trades off the benefits against the costs of this transformation.
In accord with Section 2.3, we first not that the transformation of the reference I/O
system P0 into P due to the addition of constraints U∗ can be expressed as a change in
free utility characterized by Equation (3). The free utility functional for a given conjugate
pair (P,U) can be expressed as follows
J(P;U) :=
∑
x≤T
P(x≤T )U(x≤T )− α
∑
x≤T
P(x≤T ) logP(x≤T ).
In Section 2.3 we have also emphasized that there are two variational problems, namely the
control and the estimation problem, that arise depending on the givens and the unknowns of
the variation. Naturally, this distinction carries over in the case of probability distributions
representing I/O systems.
Suppose for simplicity that T = 1. Thus, we have to find an I/O system P over a single
random variable X := X1 taking on values in X := X1. Again, we write down the difference
in free utility, but identifying the givens with P0 and the unknowns with Pr. This yields
the following two problems.
1. Control. If we are searching for a probability law P that fulfills the constraints given
by the maximization of U∗ and the minimization of the cost of the transformation
P0 → P, then we use Equation (4), i.e.
P = argmax
Pr
∑
x∈X
Pr(x)U∗(x)− α
∑
x∈X
Pr(x) log
Pr(x)
P0(x)
.
14
An axiomatic formalization of bounded rationality
2. Estimation. If we are searching for the best estimation P of the probability law P0
under the constraints U∗, then we use Equation (5), i.e.
P = argmin
Pr
∑
x∈X
P0(x) log
P0(x)
Pr(x)
.
The same idea extends to the case where T ≥ 1, obtaining a functional for the difference
in free utility that spans all the random variables. A simple way to do this is again by
recursively defining two auxiliary probability measures G and R as
G(ǫ) := 1, G(x≤t) :=
{
G(x<t)Pr(xt|x<t) if Xt is controlled,
G(x<t)P0(xt|x<t) if Xt is estimated;
R(ǫ) := 1, R(x≤t) :=
{
R(x<t)P0(xt|x<t) if Xt is controlled,
R(x<t)Pr(xt|x<t) if Xt is estimated.
(10)
Then, it is straightforward to see that the difference in free utility is given by
P = argmax
Pr


∑
x≤T
G(x≤T )U∗(x≤T )− α
∑
x≤T
G(x≤T ) log
G(x≤T )
R(x≤T )

 . (11)
4. Applications
In the following, we will illustrate applications of the variational principle for I/O systems in
Equation (11) by deriving solutions to three problems: optimal control, adaptive estimation
and adaptive control.
Let A and O be two finite sets, the first being the set of actions and the second being
the set of observations. Furthermore, let Θ be a finite set called the set of parameters.
The set Z := A × O is called the set of interactions, and a pair (a, o) ∈ Z is an
interaction. We will underline symbols to glue them together as in ao≤t := a1o1 . . . atot
to abbreviate strings of interactions. Let P and Q be I/O systems. By convention, we
will consider P the system to be designed and Q an external system to be interfaced.
Accordingly, we call P the agent, and Q the environment.
Consider the following interaction protocol. Initially, Q chooses a parameter θ ∈ Θ
unbeknownst to P. Then, the interaction proceeds in cycles t = 1, 2, . . . , T . In cycle t, P
randomly chooses a value at for the random variable At from the set of actions A conditioned
on the past I/O symbols ao<t. Q responds by choosing a value ot for the random variable
Ot from the set of observations O conditioned on the past I/O symbols θao<tat. Then the
next cycle starts. This interaction protocol determines a probability law over the causally
ordered random variables θ,A1, O1, . . . , AT , OT defined as follows:
θ ∼ Q(θ), at|θ, ao<t ∼ P(at|ao<t), ot|θ, ao<tat ∼ Q(ot|θ, ao<tat).
Note that with respect to P, θ is a latent variable, A1, . . . , AT are outputs and O1, . . . , OT
are observable inputs. Similarly for Q, θ,O1, . . . , OT are outputs, and A1, . . . , AT are
observable inputs. This interaction protocol, as known by P, is summarized in Table 1.
The applications in the following use this protocol or a simplification of it.
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Table 1: The standard interaction protocol as seen by the agent P.
X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 . . . X2T X2T+1
Name θ A1 O1 A2 O2 . . . AT OT
Alphabet Θ A O A O . . . A O
4.1 Optimal control
In optimal control problems it is generally assumed that we are given a utility function U∗
and that the environment is fully known, i.e. P0(ot|aˆo<taˆt) = Q(ot|ao<tat). The choice of
the parameter θ can be omitted. The probability measures G and R are given by
G(at|ao<t) = Pr(at|aˆo<t), G(ot|ao<tat) = P0(ot|aˆo<taˆt),
R(at|ao<t) = P0(at|aˆo<t), R(ot|ao<tat) = Pr(ot|aˆo<taˆt).
Hence, the variational problem to find P is to maximize the functional
∑
θ,ao≤T
G(ao≤T )
[
U∗(ao≤T )− α
T∑
t=1
log
Pr(at|ao<t)
P0(at|ao<t)
− α
T∑
t=1
log
P0(ot|ao<tat)
Pr(ot|ao<tat)
]
, (12)
which results from replacing G and R into (11) and by applying the equalities
Pr(at|aˆo<t) = Pr(at|ao<t), Pr(ot|aˆo<taˆt) = Pr(ot|ao<tat),
P0(at|aˆo<t) = P0(at|ao<t), P0(ot|aˆo<taˆt) = P0(ot|ao<tat)
which are easily derived using (8) repeatedly. The important observation is that (12) can be
seen as a concise way of expressing a collection of independent variational problems, where
this collection contains one variational problem for each random variable. In the variational
problem for the observation probabilities we can disregard the constraint utilities and the
resource cost of the action probabilities. The t-th summand of the total expected reward
can then be written as
∑
ao<tat
G(ao<tat)
[∑
ot
P0(ot|ao<tat) log
Pr(ot|ao<tat)
P0(ot|ao<tat)
]
.
Since varying Pr(ot|ao<tat) does not influence the summands at times 6= t, the optimal
solution to this minimum relative entropy problem is trivially obtained by P (ot|ao<tat) =
Q(ot|ao<tat). The variational problem with respect to the action probabilities is a little
bit more intricate, since varying the first action probability, for example, has an impact
on all subsequent conditional action probabilities. The functional (12) can be expanded
recursively, yielding
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∑
a1
Pr(a1)
[
U∗(a1)− α log
Pr(a1)
P0(a1)
+
∑
o1
P (o1|a1)
[
U∗(o1|a1)
+
∑
a2
Pr(a2|ao1)
[
U∗(a2|ao1)− α log
Pr(a2|ao1)
P0(a2|ao1)
+
∑
o2
P (o2|ao1a2)
[
U∗(o2|ao1a2)
+ · · ·
+
∑
aT
Pr(aT |ao<t)
[
U∗(aT |ao<T )− α log
Pr(aT |ao<T )
P0(aT |ao<T )
+
∑
oT
Pr(oT |ao<T aT )U∗(oT |ao<TaT )
]
· · ·
]]]]
,
The innermost variational problem is of the form
∑
aT
Pr(aT |ao<T )
[
U∗(at|ao<T ) +
∑
oT
P (oT |ao<TaT )U∗(oT |ao<TaT )− α log
Pr(aT |ao<T )
P0(aT |ao<T )
]
.
As discussed previously, its solution is
P (aT |ao<T ) =
P0(aT |ao<T )
Zα(ao<T )
exp
{
1
α
U∗(aT |ao<T ) +
1
α
∑
oT
P (oT |ao<TaT )U∗(oT |ao<TaT )
}
,
where Zα(ao<T ) is the normalizing constant, also known as the partition function. Similarly,
the action probabilities P (at|ao<t) can be obtained as
P (at|ao<t) =
P0(at|ao<t)
Zα(ao<t)
exp
{
1
α
U∗(at|ao<t) +
1
α
∑
ot
P (ot|ao<tat)U∗(ot|ao<tat)
+
∑
ot
P (ot|ao<tat) logZ
α(ao≤t)
}
where Zα(ao≤t) are the normalizing constants obtained for the subsequent time step. This
way the optimal action probabilities can be computed recursively.
This result allows to recover the maximum expected utility solution, and more
specifically, the dynamic programming solution. Identify the value function as V α(ao<t) :=
logZα(ao<t), and the instantaneous rewards as r(at|ao<t) := U∗(at|ao<t) and r(ot|ao<tat) :=
U∗(ot|ao<tat). If one takes the limit α→ 0, then P (at|ao<t)→ δa∗(at), where
a∗ := max
at
{
r(at|ao<t) +
∑
ot
P (ot|ao<tat)
[
r(ot|ao<tat) + V
0(ao≤t)
]}
and where the value V 0(ao<t) turns out to be given by the recursive formula
V 0(ao≤T ) := 0,
V 0(ao<t) = max
at
{
r(at|ao<t) +
∑
ot
P (ot|ao<tat)
[
r(ot|ao<tat) + V
0(ao≤t)
]}
.
Taking the limit α→∞ puts all the emphasis of the variational problem on the resource
costs. This case yields
P (at|ao<t) = P0(at|ao<t)
as expected.
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4.2 Adaptive estimation
In an adaptive estimation problem one is confronted with an unknown symbol source
P0(ot|θ, o<t) = Q(ot|θ, oˆ<t) indexed by θ ∈ Θ and chosen randomly as P0(θ) = Q(θ).
For this observation problem we can disregard the action variables and set U∗ = 0. The
probability measures G and R are given by
G(θ) = P0(θ), G(ot|θ, o<t) = P0(ot|o<t),
R(θ) = Pr(θ), R(ot|θ, o<t) = Pr(ot|o<t).
Replacing these distributions into (11) yields
−α
∑
θ,o≤T
P0(θ)
T∏
t=1
P0(ot|θ, o<t)
[
log
P0(θ)
Pr(θ)
+
T∑
t=1
log
P0(ot|θ, o<t)
Pr(ot|o<t)
]
For the parameter θ, we see that
P (θ) = P0(θ),
and that the t-th summand of the functional can then be written as
−α
∑
θ,o≤T
P0(θ)
t−1∏
t=1
P0(ot|θ, o<t)
[∑
ot
P0(ot|θ, o<t) log
P0(ot|θ, o<t)
Pr(ot|o<t)
]
The solution to this variational problem is well-known in the literature (Haussler and Opper,
1997; Opper, 1998) and is solved by the predictive distribution
P (ot|o<t) =
∑
θ
P0(θ|o<t)P0(ot|θ, o<t),
where the posterior P0(θ|o<t) is computed according to Bayes’ rule.
4.3 Adaptive control
In adaptive control problems the environment is not known a priori, but known to belong
to a set of possible environments P0(ot|θ, aˆo<taˆt) = Q(ot|θ, aoˆ<tat) indexed by θ ∈ Θ and
chosen randomly as P0(θ) := Q(θ). We have also seen that quantities that are estimated
require the solution of a variational problem that is local in time—in contrast to quantities
that are controlled, which require the solution of a variational problem that stretches over
the whole future. Can we devise an adaptive controller that is based on pure estimation?
If we also happen to know a set of controllers P0(at|θ, aˆo<t) for each of these
environments (for instance, constructed previously by solving the individual optimal control
problems), then a Bayesian rule for control can be devised—compare Ortega and Braun
(2010). Since in pure estimation problems constraint utilities do not matter, we impose
U∗ = 0 for the sake of simplicity. The probability measures G and R are given by
G(θ) = P0(θ), G(at|θ, ao<t) = P0(at|θ, aˆo<t), G(ot|θ, ao<tat) = P0(ot|θ, aˆo<taˆt),
R(θ) = Pr(θ), R(at|θ, ao<t) = Pr(at|aˆo<t), R(ot|θ, ao<tat) = Pr(ot|aˆo<taˆt).
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Inserting them into (11) yields
−α
∑
θ,ao≤T
P0(θ)
( T∏
t=1
P0(at|θ, aˆo<t)P0(ot|θ, aˆo<taˆt)
) T∑
t=1
[
log
P0(at|θ, aˆo<t)
Pr(at|aˆo<t)
+ log
P0(ot|θ, aˆo<tat)
Pr(ot|aˆo<tat)
]
Again, for the parameter θ, we see that
P (θ) = P0(θ).
For the variational problem of the observation at time t we can again disregard the resource
costs of the actions. Analogous to the solution for adaptive estimation, the variational
problem is equivalent to
− α
∑
θ,ao
<t
at
P0(θ)
(t−1∏
τ=1
P0(aτ |θ, aˆo<τ )P0(oτ |θ, aˆo<τ aˆτ )
)
P0(at|θ, aˆo<t)
×
∑
ot
P0(ot|θ, aˆo<taˆt) log
P0(ot|θ, aˆo<taˆt)
Pr(ot|θ, aˆo<taˆt)
which is solved by the predictive distribution
P (ot|aˆo<taˆt) =
∑
θ
P0(θ|aˆo<taˆt)P0(ot|θ, aˆo<taˆt).
For actions, the procedure is identical. Thus, the variational problem for the t-th action is
given by
−α
∑
θ,ao<t
P0(θ)
(t−1∏
τ=1
P0(aτ |θ, aˆo<τ )P0(oτ |θ, aˆo<τ aˆτ )
)∑
at
P0(at|θ, aˆo<t) log
P0(at|θ, aˆo<t)
Pr(at|θ, aˆo<t)
again solved by the predictive distribution
P (at|aˆo<t) =
∑
θ
P0(θ|aˆo<t)P0(at|θ, aˆo<t).
This result has been previously reported as the Bayesian control rule (Ortega and Braun,
2008; Braun and Ortega, 2010). By sampling from the predictive distribution P (at+1|aˆo≤t)
the agent can solve adaptive control problems, such as bandit problems, adaptive linear
quadratic control problems and Markov decision problems with unknown transition
matrices.
5. Discussion
In this study we have used causal models to construct probability distributions representing
I/O systems. As I/O systems both process input symbols and generate output symbols,
their characterization requires both evidential and generative probabilities. The evidential
probabilities (“plausibilities” in the subjectivist sense of probability) allow the I/O system
to infer properties about the input stream, while the generative probabilities (“propensities”
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in the frequentist sense) prescribe the law to generate its output stream. The importance of
distinguishing between input and output, more commonly known as the difference between
seeing and doing, and their impact on inference, lies at the heart of statistical causality
(Pearl, 2000; Spirtes and Scheines, 2001).
Based on the equivalence of information and utility, we have devised a variational
principle to construct I/O systems. Structural similarities between utilities and information
have been previously reported in the literature (Candeal et al., 2001). For the case of
known environments, a duality between optimal control and estimation has been previously
reported by Todorov (2008), where an exponential transformation mediates between the
cost-to-go function and a probability distribution that acts as a backwards filter. For
the case of optimally learning systems in unknown environments, a duality between
utility and information has been reported by Belavkin (2008), considering the problem of
optimal learning as a variational problem of expected utility maximization with dynamical
information constraints. An information-theoretic approach to interactive learning based
on principles from statistical physics has also been proposed by Still (2009). The use of
the Kullback-Leibler divergence to measure deviations from a reference distribution as a
cost function for control has been previously proposed by Todorov (2006, 2009) and by
Kappen, Gomez, and Opper (2009). In these studies, transition probabilities of Markov
systems were manipulated directly and the cost measured as a probabilistic deviation with
respect to the passive dynamics of the system. Adaptive controllers based on the minimum
relative entropy principle have been previously reported in Ortega and Braun (2008) and
in Braun and Ortega (2010). The contribution of our study is to devise a single axiomatic
framework that allows for the solution of both control and adaptation problems based on
the equivalence of utility and information. This axiomatic framework leads to a single
variational principle to solve both problems. The resulting controllers optimize a trade-
off between maximization of a target utility function and resource costs and can hence be
interpreted as bounded-rational actors.
The idea of bounded rationality through the consideration of information costs has been
first proposed by Simon (1982). In game theory, information theory has been proposed to
formalize bounded rational players whose degree of rationality is given by a temperature
parameter trading off entropy and payoff (Wolpert, 2004). The distinction between disclosed
and undisclosed information has also been studied extensively in the literature on game
theory regarding problems of incomplete or imperfect information (see Gibbons 1992,
and Osborne and Rubinstein 1999). Like these previous studies, our work has obvious
connections to information theory (Shannon, 1948), thermodynamics (see e.g. Callen 1985)
and statistical inference (see e.g. the maximum entropy principles in Jaynes and Bretthorst
2003).
6. Conclusions
The main contribution of the current paper is to derive axiomatically a framework for
bounded rationality. We propose to formalize agents as probability distributions over
I/O streams. Based on the idea that a free system produces an outcome with higher
probability if and only if it is more desirable, we postulate three simple axioms relating
utilities and probabilities. We show that these axioms enforce a unique conversion law
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between utility and probability (and thereby, information). Moreover, we show that this
relation can be characterized as a variational principle: given a utility function, its conjugate
probability measure maximizes the free utility functional. We exhibit how constrained
transformations of probability measures can be characterized as a change in free utility and
use this to formulate a model of bounded rationality. Accordingly, one obtains a variational
principle to choose a probability measure that trades off the maximization of a target utility
function and the cost of the deviation from a reference distribution. We show that optimal
control, adaptive estimation and adaptive control problems can be solved this way in a
resource-efficient way. When resource costs are ignored, the MEU principle is recovered.
Our formalization might thus provide a principled approach to bounded rationality that
establishes a link to information theory.
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